November 6, 2025:
This year Russia is spending six percent of GDP on the military. That was easy compared to finding Russian manufacturers who could build what the military wanted at a price that allowed for obtaining all the items required. Ukrainian forces have halted and pushed back the Russian offensives because the Ukrainian obtained more effective weapons in sufficient quantities. Some 70 percent of these weapons are built in Ukraine. Most of these weapons are designed and developed by Ukrainians who realize the survival of their nation depends on how well these weapons work. Another advantage is access to components from whoever has them. Most come from NATO countries, but China supplies drones and drone components.
In late 2024 China unexpectedly halted delivery of these items to Ukraine. What Ukraine was not receiving went to Russia instead. This was apparently done to improve Russian Chinese relationships. China helps Russia to remain competitive with Ukrainian drone manufacturers and expects Russia to return the favor in the future. Meanwhile, Ukrainian drone manufactures are threatening Chinese dominance of the drone market. The significance of this threat was demonstrated when Ukraine was quickly able to find other suppliers.
Russia is depending on China for more than drones and drone components. Western economic sanctions have done serious and growing damage to the Russian economy and its ability to produce all sorts of weapons. While Ukraine was obtaining most of its weapons and munitions from NATO countries, Ukraine also had its own defense industries that were thriving before the Russian 2022 invasion. Before Russia turned on Ukraine in 2014, Russia was one of many foreign customers for Ukrainian military technology. By 2022, Ukraine and Russia were no longer supporting each other’s defense industries. While Ukraine had NATO nations as a wartime supplier, Russia was on its own and scrambling to cope with numerous economic sanctions imposed after they invaded Ukraine. Many Ukrainian defense industry personnel had detailed knowledge of Russian defense industries and what the key vulnerabilities were. This enabled Ukrainian military intelligence to monitor and attack Russian weapons production.
By late 2023 Ukraine believed that Russia had nearly exhausted its pre-2022 stocks of Kalibr cruise missiles and Iskander tactical ballistic missiles, and lacked the industrial capability to replace those stocks or even produce a significant number under wartime conditions. Ukrainian and NATO industrial intelligence efforts have identified Russian sources for key missile components that must be imported and which suppliers are willing to smuggle items into Russia. Smuggled components are a lot more expensive because the smugglers have expenses and must take into account losses when smuggled shipments are intercepted and seized. Russia also has to seek out and use alternative components to those it simply cannot obtain. This complicates production because the substitute components do not always function as effectively as the original parts.
Ukraine uses its detailed knowledge of Russian military production to target key Russian production facilities for attacks. These are carried out by missiles or larger drones equipped as bombers and, if that is not possible, Ukraine has the option to use operatives inside Russia to attack or sabotage the facility. So far, these efforts have crippled but not halted Russian missile production. The quality of the new Russian missiles is less than before and the Russians accept this because most of the missiles will still work as intended. Russian-made missiles and munitions were always known to be less reliable and an increase in unreliability is considered acceptable to the Russians, though a relief to Ukrainians be targeted. Dud missiles are not harmless. They will land somewhere in Ukraine and some will even explode when they hit the ground. Ukrainians are used to Russian missiles and shells not exploding when they land nearby, realize the things might still go off, and usually call for EOD/Explosive Ordnanc
The shabby construction of recently manufactured Russian missiles reduces the number of effective attacks on Ukrainian targets. NATO and Ukraine are continuing and expanding these efforts to all manner of military items, some of them dual use. This includes truck tires. Russian made truck tires were notorious for their poor quality and unreliability. Before the war, vehicle owners would, if they could, buy foreign tires but that is not an option in wartime. NATO sanctions and Ukrainian sabotage efforts have made tires produced in Russia even more unreliable. This has a disruptive impact on the Russian economy and for Russian troops it’s another reason why supplies or reinforcements don’t arrive on time, if at all.
The Ukraine War has been bad for Russian defense industries and sanctions have put many firms out of business while others are barely surviving. A similar disaster took place after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991 and military procurement funds nearly disappeared for most of the 1990s. Since the late 1990s surviving Russian defense firms have been trying to rebuild. The Ukraine War seemed, at first, to be a source of more business. There was more activity, but of the malevolent kind that brought more problems rather than more procurement money.
This means plans to modernize defense industries will have to wait until the war is over. While the war is still under way, Russian defense manufacturers concentrate on quantity, not quality. The inability to obtain additional manufacturing equipment is only partially handled with Chinese imports.